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Utility-maximizing behavior in organized anarchies: An empirical investigation of the Breneman thesis

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  • Fred Thompson

Abstract

What do we learn from this? In the first place, the results presented here do tend to confirm the Breneman hypothesis. This may be of some practical interest to anyone concerned with financing Ph.D. granting institutions, e.g., if one is interested in efficient use of the student input, one might wish to buy degrees, as in New York, rather than enrollments. More importantly, these findings tend to confirm the utility of assuming that not-for-profit organizations behave as if they maximized something — revenue, prestige, whatever — despite certain knowledge that, in practice, decision making in these organizations violates every single axiom of rationality. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv 1981

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  • Fred Thompson, 1981. "Utility-maximizing behavior in organized anarchies: An empirical investigation of the Breneman thesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 17-32, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:36:y:1981:i:1:p:17-32
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00163767
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    1. John Lewis & T. Cott, 1979. "Non-monetary competition for students within the university," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 359-363, September.
    2. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
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