Political coalition bargaining behaviour
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718666
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- John G. Cross, 1967. "Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 11(2), pages 184-195, June.
- Browne, Eric C. & Franklin, Mark N., 1973. "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 453-469, June.
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