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The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court

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  • Saul Brenner
  • Joseph Whitmeyer
  • Harold Spaeth

Abstract

We investigate whether the substantial use of the outcome-prediction strategy by Supreme Court justices occurs in the petitions denied certiorari by the Court. We show with a computer simulation that [Caldeira, G.A., Wright, J.R., & Zorn, C.J.W. (1999). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15, 549–572], who modeled the missing final votes for denied petitions in order to include them in their study of the use of the outcome-prediction strategy, may have obtained spurious results. Application of the logic of conditional probabilities to the denied petitions suggests that all but those denied by the narrowest of margins are probably considered unacceptable by the justices on non-outcome-oriented grounds, and, therefore, are not subject to use of this strategy. We evaluate the pursuit of the outcome-prediction strategy in petitions that narrowly fail to be granted cert by focusing upon the petitions that are narrowly granted cert and find limited use of the strategy. We conclude that the outcome-prediction strategy probably is little used by the justices in confronting the petitions denied cert and that investigations of the use of this strategy are best confined to those petitions granted cert. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Saul Brenner & Joseph Whitmeyer & Harold Spaeth, 2007. "The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 225-237, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:130:y:2007:i:1:p:225-237
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9082-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caldeira, Gregory A & Wright, John R & Zorn, Christopher J W, 1999. "Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 549-572, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, 2008. "Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 5(3), pages 407-446, September.

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