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Propitious Selection in Insurance

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Author Info
 Hemenway, David
Abstract

The theory of propitious selection suggests that there are risk-avoiding personalities who both take physical precautions and buy financial security (insurance). Conversely, there are risk seekers who tend to do neither. Survey evidence is presented that is consistent with the theory. Individuals who obtain motor vehicle liability coverage are less likely than others to drink-and-drive, and are more likely to engage in health-beneficial (risk-avoiding) behaviors. Propitious selection may be a general phenomenon promoting favorable selection in many real world insurance markets. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 5 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 247-51
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:5:y:1992:i:3:p:247-51

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  1. CRÉMER, Jacques & GAUDEUL, Alexandre, 2004. "Quelques éléments d'économie du logiciel libre," IDEI Working Papers 277, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Philip Verwimp, 2003. "Micro-level Evidence from Rwanda," HiCN Working Papers 08, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
  3. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean J.G., 2006. "Does Propitious Selection Explain Why Riskier People Buy Less Insurance?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5640, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman, . "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 2132841, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Manuel Santos & Jorge Aseff, . "Stock Options and Managerial Optimal Contracts," Working Papers 2133304, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. DÉCAMPS, Jean-Paul & LOVO, Stefano, 2003. "Risk Aversion and Herd Behavior in Financial Markets," IDEI Working Papers 246, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  8. HAIMANKO, Ori & LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2003. "Voluntary Formation of Communities for the Provision of Public Projects," IDEI Working Papers 169, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. JULLIEN, Bruno & SALANIÉ, Bernard & SALANIÉ, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  11. DÉCAMPS, Jean-Paul & LOVO, Stefano, 2003. "Market Informational Inefficiency, Risk Aversion and Quantity Grid," IDEI Working Papers 177, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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