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Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection

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  • Philippe Donder

    ()

  • Jean Hindriks

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11166-008-9056-7
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 73-86

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:73-86

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299

Related research

Keywords: Cherry picking; Propitious selection; Advantageous selection; Precaution choice; Social insurance; D82; G22;

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References

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  1. De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003. "The Politics of Redistributive Social Insurance," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  2. John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, 1997. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade inInsurance," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 132, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  3. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
  4. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 1999. "Should More Risk-Averse Agents Exert More Effort ?," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
  5. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January.
  6. DE FEO, Giuseppe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2005. "Efficiency of competition in insurance markets with adverse selection," CORE Discussion Papers 2005054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. David M. Cutler & Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 157-62, May.
  8. Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January.
  9. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356.
  10. Bertrand Villeneuve, 2000. "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 65-79, June.
  11. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
  12. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2003. "Private Information and its Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," NBER Working Papers 9957, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November.
  14. Cutler, David & McGarry, Kathleen & Finkelstein, Amy, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," Scholarly Articles 2640581, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  15. Hemenway, David, 1992. " Propitious Selection in Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 247-51, July.
  16. Louis Eeckhoudt & Christian Gollier, 2005. "The impact of prudence on optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 989-994, November.
  17. W. Kip Viscusi & Jahn K Hakes, 2008. "Risk Beliefs And Smoking Behavior," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(1), pages 45-59, 01.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Arvidsson, Sara, 2010. "Reducing asymmetric information with usage-based automobile insurance," Working Papers 2010:2, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), revised 03 Feb 2011.
  2. Hultkrantz, Lars & Lindberg, Gunnar, 2009. "Pay-As-You-Speed: An Economic Field-Experiment," Working Papers 2009:12, Örebro University, School of Business.
  3. Pau Olivella & Fred Schroyen, 2012. "Multidimensional Screening in a Monopolistic Insurance Market," Working Papers 619, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.

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