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Misleading Disclosure of Pro Forma Earnings: An Empirical Examination

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Author Info
Gary Entwistle ()
Glenn Feltham
Chima Mbagwu
Abstract

The Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act was passed in 2002 in response to various instances of corporate malfeasance. The Act, designed to protect investors, led to wide-ranging regulation over various actions of managers, auditors and investment analysts. Part of SOX, and the focus of this study, targeted the disclosure by firms of “pro formaâ€\x9D earnings, an alternate (from GAAP earnings), flexible and unaudited measure of firm performance. Specifically, SOX directed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to craft regulation which would reduce – and preferably eliminate – any pro forma earnings disclosure which might be “misleadingâ€\x9D. Examining earnings press releases over a 3-year period, this study addresses three questions. Were firms disclosing pro forma in a potentially misleading manner, what was the nature of this potentially misleading disclosure, and did SOX affect the disclosure practices? We find the following. In 2001 (prior to SOX), 53 firms – over 10% of all U.S. S&P 500 firms – were disclosing pro forma earnings in a potentially misleading manner. This was being done most commonly by using traditional GAAP terminology (e.g., “net incomeâ€\x9D) in the press release headline to describe what was later in the press release revealed to be a pro forma amount (i.e., “net income excluding special itemsâ€\x9D). By 2003 (subsequent to the SEC regulation), potentially misleading disclosure practices were seen in less than 1% of the earnings press releases of S&P 500 firms. This significant reduction suggests that managers, prior to the regulation, were either careless in their pro forma reporting practice, or were intentionally – and unethically – attempting to mislead investors. Either way, we conclude that the SEC regulation was both necessary and effective. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10551-006-9095-4
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Business Ethics.

Volume (Year): 69 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 355-372
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:69:y:2006:i:4:p:355-372

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Keywords: pro forma earnings; disclosure management; misleading; regulation;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peltzman, Sam, 1981. "The Effects of FTC Advertising Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 403-48, December.
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  2. Bhattacharya, Nilabhra & Black, Ervin L. & Christensen, Theodore E. & Larson, Chad R., 2003. "Assessing the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 285-319, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Mark T. Bradshaw, 2002. "GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings," Journal of Accounting Research, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(1), pages 41-66, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
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  1. David Hillier & Allan Hodgson & Peta Stevenson-Clarke & Suntharee Lhaopadchan, 2008. "Accounting Window Dressing and Template Regulation: A Case Study of the Australian Credit Union Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 579-593, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jeffrey Miller, 2009. "Opportunistic Disclosures of Earnings Forecasts and Non-GAAP Earnings Measures," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 89(1), pages 3-10, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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