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Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World

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  • Mark Jackson

Abstract

Constitutional economics proposes and pursues a solution to public-policy problems, one that supplies rules designed to narrow the opportunity set of rational politicians. This work proposes and pursues “rational policy” as a complementary strategy to solve public-policy problems, where rational policy is public-policy that actualizes Adam Smith’s simple system of natural liberty. When individuals pursue their objectives by means of exchange in Smith’s simple system of natural liberty, they foster the growth of per-capita income. By contrast, all limitations on liberty limit the growth of per-capita income. The paper concludes by presenting two implications that follow from these conclusions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Jackson, 2005. "Liberty and Economic Growth in Adam Smith’s Possible World," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 277-284, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:16:y:2005:i:3:p:277-284
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2834-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    2. von Hayek, Friedrich August, 1989. "The Pretence of Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3-7, December.
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    Keywords

    liberty; Adam Smith; growth;
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