Raising the Retirement Age--Why Should Anybody Lose?
AbstractThis paper questions the view that a rise of the retirement age does not reduce the financial problems of a pay-as-you-go public pension system if individuals receive compensations for additional years spent in the labor force. It is shown that rather utility compensation is required than actuarial compensation. As the former is lower it creates an opportunity to raise the retirement age in a Pareto-improving way. By performing a dynamic CGE analysis for Germany, a compensation scheme is derived which is not only Pareto-improving but leads to a large reduction of the contribution rates.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics in its journal Journal of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 219 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3+4 (September)
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Public pension; computable overlapping generations model;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
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- Georg Hirte, 2002. "Welfare and Macroeconomic Effects of the German Pension Acts of 1992 and 1999: A Dynamic CGE Study," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 3(1), pages 81-106, 02.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Silke Übelmesser, 2000. "Wann kippt Deutschland um?," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 53(28-29), pages 20-25, November.
- Silke Uebelmesser & Hans-Werner Sinn, 2001.
"When will the Germans Get Trapped in their Pension System?,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
561, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hans-Werner Sinn & Silke Uebelmesser, 2001. "When Will the Germans Get Trapped in their Pension System?," NBER Working Papers 8503, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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