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Competition in a Multimarket Environment: The Case of Market Exit

Author

Listed:
  • Warren Boeker

    (London Business School, Sussex Place, Regent's Park, London, United Kingdom, NW1 4SA)

  • Jerry Goodstein

    (Washington State University, Vancouver, Washington 98663)

  • John Stephan

    (University at Buffalo/SUNY, Buffalo, New York 14260)

  • Johann Peter Murmann

    (Columbia University, New York, New York 10027)

Abstract

Studies of competition typically have two underlying assumptions: that competition occurs within the boundaries of industries or markets and that all firms in a market or industry are affected equally by competitive pressures. The concept of multipoint competition challenges both assumptions. Multipoint theory addresses how different levels of contact between firms across multiple markets affect competition in individual markets. Its main argument is that high levels of contact between firms across markets will induce mutual forbearance, causing multipoint competitors to refrain from aggressively attacking each other.The restraint stems from the fact that high levels of intermarket contact enable a firm to respond to an aggressive action by a multipoint rival in markets other than the one in which the action takes place. That possibility raises the potential costs of aggressive moves and serves as a credible deterrent, especially if a firm can respond in several markets. In addition, multipoint competition helps firms to interpret their rivals' intentions and signal their own, reducing the likelihood of costly misunderstandings.The authors elaborate on those ideas to examine how a hospital's degree of intermarket contact with its competitors in a particular service market affects the likelihood that it will exit that market. They find that hospitals are less likely to exit markets in which they meet large numbers of their multipoint rivals. As a result of mutual forbearance, competitive rivalry is reduced across the markets that multipoint rivals share, lessening the types of pressures that typically prompt market exit. With lower levels of competitive rivalry, markets shared by multipoint rivals are relatively more hospitable environments in which to operate and are less likely to be exited. Rather than competing intensely, multipoint rivals appear to adopt a “live and let live” approach toward each other.The fact that multipoint contact across markets may lessen competitive pressures within individual markets has implications for the contact between firms in several settings. Multimarket contact can occur across different product or service markets and also across different geographic markets, thus affording an intriguing perspective for the investigation of the rivalry between emerging transnational firms. True transnationals, by successfully integrating global operations while still addressing local market concerns, have been seen by some as having the capabilities necessary for successful performance in international competition. Perhaps transnational firms, because they have an integrated decision-making structure, can coordinate their actions to reduce competitive rivalry with each other across the markets they share. If so, markets dominated by transnationals may become more stable than the current state of international competition would predict.

Suggested Citation

  • Warren Boeker & Jerry Goodstein & John Stephan & Johann Peter Murmann, 1997. "Competition in a Multimarket Environment: The Case of Market Exit," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(2), pages 126-142, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:8:y:1997:i:2:p:126-142
    DOI: 10.1287/orsc.8.2.126
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Canan Mutlu & Wu Zhan & Mike Peng & Zhiang Lin, 2015. "Competing in (and out of) transition economies," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 571-596, September.
    2. Faouzi Bensebaa, 2003. "La dynamique concurrentielle:défis analytiques et méthodologiques," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(1), pages 5-37, March.
    3. Özgecan Koçak & Serden Özcan, 2013. "How Does Rivals' Presence Affect Firms' Decision to Enter New Markets? Economic and Sociological Explanations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2586-2603, November.
    4. Zinn, Jacqueline & Mor, Vincent & Feng, Zhanlian & Intrator, Orna, 2009. "Determinants of performance failure in the nursing home industry," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 933-940, March.
    5. Bahoo-Torodi, Aliasghar & Torrisi, Salvatore, 2022. "When do spinouts benefit from market overlap with parent firms?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 37(6).
    6. Joel A. C. Baum & Anne Bowers & Partha Mohanram, 2016. "Mutual Forbearance and Competition Among Security Analysts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(6), pages 1610-1631, June.
    7. Udo Staber, 2001. "Spatial Proximity and Firm Survival in a Declining Industrial District: The Case of Knitwear Firms in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(4), pages 329-341.
    8. John Stephan & Johann Peter Murmann & Warren Boeker & Jerry Goodstein, 2003. "Bringing Managers into Theories of Multimarket Competition: CEOs and the Determinants of Market Entry," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 403-421, August.
    9. Humoud Alsabah & Benjamin Bernard & Agostino Capponi & Garud Iyengar & Jay Sethuraman, 2021. "Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(8), pages 4789-4808, August.
    10. Gast, Andreas. & Lessard, Donald R., 1997. "Multi-point knowledge development processes in the multinational firm," Working papers WP 3985-97., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    11. Manuela N. Hoehn-Weiss & Samina Karim & Chi-Hyon Lee, 2017. "Examining Alliance Portfolios Beyond the Dyads: The Relevance of Redundancy and Nonuniformity Across and Between Partners," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 56-73, February.
    12. Brian T. McCann & Govert Vroom, 2014. "Competitive Behavior and Nonfinancial Objectives: Entry, Exit, and Pricing Decisions in Closely Held Firms," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(4), pages 969-990, August.
    13. Matt Theeke & Hun Lee, 2017. "Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(12), pages 2508-2531, December.
    14. Jaime Gómez & Raquel Orcos & Sergio Palomas, 2013. "Multimarket Contact Externalities: The Effect of Rivals' Multimarket Contacts on Focal Firm Performance," Working Papers 1302, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Apr 2013.
    15. Kai-Yu Hsieh & Freek Vermeulen, 2014. "The Structure of Competition: How Competition Between One’s Rivals Influences Imitative Market Entry," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(1), pages 299-319, February.
    16. Vroom, Govert & Mccann, Brian T., 2009. "Ownership structure, profit maximization, and competitive behavior," IESE Research Papers D/800, IESE Business School.
    17. Jose N. Uribe, 2020. "Multipoint contact without forbearance? How coverage synergies shape equity analysts' forecasting performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(10), pages 1901-1932, October.
    18. Rehnen, Lena Marie, 2016. "Exit strategies of loyalty programs," jbm - Journal of Business Market Management, Free University Berlin, Marketing Department, vol. 9(1), pages 564-596.
    19. Andrew V. Shipilov, 2009. "Firm Scope Experience, Historic Multimarket Contact with Partners, Centrality, and the Relationship Between Structural Holes and Performance," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 85-106, February.
    20. Degl’Innocenti, Marta & Girardone, Claudia & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2014. "Diversification, multimarket contacts and profits in the leasing industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 231-252.
    21. Jin, Tuofu & Eapen, Alex, 2022. "‘Delayed Forbearance’: Multipoint contact and mutual forbearance in inaugural and subsequent competitive actions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 938-953.
    22. Simon Dekeyser & Ann Gaeremynck & W. Robert Knechel & Marleen Willekens, 2021. "Multimarket Contact and Mutual Forbearance in Audit Markets," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(5), pages 1651-1688, December.

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