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Contracts for Changing Times: Sourcing with Raw Material Price Volatility and Information Asymmetry

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  • Wei Zhang

    (Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095)

  • Deke Zhou

    (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

  • Liwen Liu

    (School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

Abstract

We analyze and compare five contract schemes used in a supply chain: fixed price (FP), cost reimbursement (CR), procurement control (PC), index-linked payment (IL), and relational (RL) contracts. From interviews, we learned that (1) FP and RL are the two most popular schemes; (2) PC is less popular, but it is used more often than CR and IL; and (3) a couple of firms are considering CR and IL and will probably use them in the future. By presenting a two-stage contracting model that incorporates a risk-neutral buyer and a risk-averse supplier under raw material price uncertainty and information asymmetry, we show that overhedging the supplier's risk with an IL contract can be optimal for the buyer in many cases. Using the model to study the effects of price trends, risk attitudes, information asymmetry, and constraints on purchase time, we find that each contract can be optimal in certain situations from certain standpoints. In particular, when a long-term relationship is considered, RL is equivalent to IL as long as the contract is self-enforcing, and RL can replace IL when no index is available. Connecting the analytical results to the interviews, we find that firms' choices and considerations can be well understood.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei Zhang & Deke Zhou & Liwen Liu, 2014. "Contracts for Changing Times: Sourcing with Raw Material Price Volatility and Information Asymmetry," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 16(1), pages 133-148, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormsom:v:16:y:2014:i:1:p:133-148
    DOI: 10.1287/msom.2013.0454
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    3. Zhao, Xuan & Xing, Wei & Liu, Liming & Wang, Shouyang, 2015. "Demand information and spot price information: Supply chains trading in spot markets," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 246(3), pages 837-849.
    4. Jun Zhao, 2022. "Will the community O2O service supply channel benefit the elderly healthcare service supply chain?," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1617-1650, December.
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    6. Belleh Fontem & Megan Price, 2021. "Joint client selection and contract design for a risk-averse commodity broker in a two-echelon supply chain," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 307(1), pages 111-138, December.

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