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Negociaciones de máxima probabilidad para juegos cooperativos con fines comerciales

Author

Listed:
  • Gerardo Manuell Cid

    (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, México)

  • Luis V. Montiel

    (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, México)

Abstract

El objetivo de este trabajo presenta un método para encontrar la estrategia de pagos que maximiza la probabilidad de cerrar una negociación en escenarios cooperativos de utilidad transferible con fines comerciales. Este procedimiento utiliza una herramienta de simulación llamada JDSIM para muestrear el Core del juego y generar funciones empíricas de probabilidad acumuladas de los pagos de cada actor con el fin de establecer la negociación que maximiza el producto de estas funciones. Este método se compara con otros dos ya establecidos en la literatura, llamados Shapley Value (SV) y el centroide del Core, a través de treinta escenarios aleatorios y un caso práctico en los que se observa que este siempre ofrece soluciones únicas, implementables, y proporciona una justificación racional, a diferencia de los ya mencionados. Hay que considerar que este trabajo únicamente pretende resolver negociaciones en las que la distribución de los pagos permite a todos los actores unirse en una sola coalición, sin embargo, el paradigma presentado se puede adaptar a subcoaliciones de menor tamaño para extender su alcance. Esta solución propone una mejor alternativa a las que se encuentran en la literatura y representa un avance importante en áreas de negociación y teoría de juegos.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerardo Manuell Cid & Luis V. Montiel, 2019. "Negociaciones de máxima probabilidad para juegos cooperativos con fines comerciales," Remef - Revista Mexicana de Economía y Finanzas Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance), Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas, IMEF, vol. 14(2), pages 245-259, Abril-Jun.
    • Handle: RePEc:imx:journl:v:14:y:2019:i:2:p:245-259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590, Elsevier.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negociación; Shapley Value; Core; JDSIM; Simulación de Juegos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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