Revisiting the Lemons Market
AbstractThis article extends the standard competitive adverse selection model by allowing for qualitatively different information structures of agents on the informed side of the market. Using the stylized framework of the market for used cars, we examine the welfare properties of equilibria under the assumption that a fraction of the sellers remains uninformed about a parameter that is relevant for their own transaction. Whether market performance increases o decreases in the number of uninformed sellers is shown to depend on (1) the potential gains from trade in the market and (2) the average quality of the sellers information structure.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
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- Bart Wilson & Arthur Zillante, 2010. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 1-16, February.
- Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2014.
"Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 127-143.
- Paul Belleflamme & Martin Peitz, 2009. "Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 2619, CESifo Group Munich.
- Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2009. "Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 335-350, November.
- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and the Supply Size," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 099, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
- Blouin, Max R., 2003. "Quality undersupply and oversupply," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 130-139, March.
- F. Adriani & LG. Deidda, 2006. "The Monopolist’s Blues," Working Paper CRENoS 200611, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
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