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Abnormal Returns and Fundamental Analysis in Institutional Investors’ Decision-making: An Agency Theory Approach

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Listed:
  • Mario Mustilli
  • Francesco Campanella
  • Eugenio D’Angelo

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the abnormal returns achieved by institutional investors. Distinguishing between institutional investors operating with a specific mandate to invest and those that operate their own choices independently from such a specific delegation, we show that the former achieve higher abnormal returns than the latter. The conceptual explanation of this result is attributable to the use of the fundamental analysis that the first type of institutional investors realized in a higher and more effective way than the second. This different approach in selecting securities might be due to the relationship between the institutional investor and the savers who provided capital. This different agency relationship might have been reflected in the institutional investor's investment policies through the agent behaviour, which changes depending on the nature of the principal who has given the mandate. The empirical analysis has been conducted on a sample of 5,500 institutional investors operating all around the world in 2014, drawing data from institutional investor's annual report, from their investment relations and from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Bankscope, Eurostat and through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Mustilli & Francesco Campanella & Eugenio D’Angelo, 2018. "Abnormal Returns and Fundamental Analysis in Institutional Investors’ Decision-making: An Agency Theory Approach," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(2), pages 55-69, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ibrjnl:v:11:y:2018:i:2:p:55-69
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agency theory; institutional investors; fundamental analysis; abnormal return;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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