Voting by Ballots and Feet in the Laboratory
AbstractThis paper provides laboratory evidence on the efficiency-enhancing properties of the Tiebout model as a decentralized system of public goods provision. Tiebout (1956) shows that if a sufficient number of local communities exist to accommodate different types of preferences, individuals sort themselves in a way that provides an efficient allocation of public goods and taxes. Our experiment aims to disentangle the effect of voting participation from other factors and is composed of two treatments. In the non-participation treatment, local public good provision is chosen by only one subject, while other members of the community can only stay in or move to another community. In the participation treatment, all the community members have the right to vote as well as to move to another community and collective decisions are taken by majority rule. Our findings show that social welfare is greater in the participation than in the non-participation treatment. We conclude that voting with one?s feet increases efficiency if all the community members vote and that the influence of voting participation on the allocation of local public goods should be taken into account to assess the viability of the Tiebout model.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.
Volume (Year): 70 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Innocenti & Chiara Rapallini, 2011. "Voting by Ballots and Feet in the Laboratory," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 036, University of Siena.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Feet vs. ballots in local policy choices
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-02-28 15:54:00
- Enrica Carbone & Gerardo Infante, 2012. "Are Groups Better Planners Than Individuals? An Experimental Analysis," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 042, University of Siena.
- Alessandro Innocenti & Francesca Lorini & Chiara Rapallini, 2014. "Ethnic Heterogeneity, Voting Partecipation and Local Economic Growth. The Case of Belgium," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_03.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012.
"Reputation and Entry,"
EIEF Working Papers Series
1215, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Nov 2012.
- Jeffrey V. Butler & Enrica Carbone & Pierluigi Conzo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 045, University of Siena.
- Butler, Jeffrey & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012. "Reputation and Entry," SITE Working Paper Series 21, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Butler, Jeffrey V. & Carbone, Enrica & Conzo, Pierluigi & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2013. "Reputation and Entry," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2013:3, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
- Valeria Faralla & Alessandro Innocenti & Eva Venturini, 2013. "Risk Taking and Social Exposure," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 046, University of Siena.
- Valeria Faralla & Alessandro Innocenti & Stefano Taddei & Eva Venturini, 2013. "Physiological Responses to Stressful Work Situations in Low-Immersive Virtual Environments," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 047, University of Siena.
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