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China’s Environmental Vertical Management Reform: An Effective and Sustainable Way Forward or Trouble in Itself?

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  • Di Zhou

    (School of Marxism, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

Abstract

An environmental management system provides the institutional foundation for sound environmental governance. Conventional environmental management systems, deriving from the combination of the vertical management of competent authorities and the localized management of local governments, can lead to local protectionism and implementation deviation at the local level. Since 2016, environmental vertical management reform has been performed as a significant part of the overall promotion of the ecological civilization in China. Representing the most fundamental reform of China’s local environmental management system since the Environmental Protection Law of 1989, the environmental vertical management reform focuses on the reconstruction and adjustment of the environmental management functions among the local governments, and their environment protection authorities at the provincial, city, and county levels. In this paper, we provide an overview of the basic theory of the vertical management model, as well as the motivation for—and the legal/policy background, focuses/content, local practices, and results of—the environmental vertical management reform in China. In the discussion section, we analyze the current problems that impede the effectiveness and sustainability of this reform. On the basis of the analysis of the present and the problems, we raise the question of whether this round of reform is effective and will be sustainable in the future. In response to the challenges, feasible recommendations are proposed. These suggestions include firmly promoting the rule of law in the process of implementing the reform, enhancing the institutional supply and capacity building at the grassroots level, and taking advantage of the holistic governance under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Suggested Citation

  • Di Zhou, 2020. "China’s Environmental Vertical Management Reform: An Effective and Sustainable Way Forward or Trouble in Itself?," Laws, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-27, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:9:y:2020:i:4:p:25-:d:443169
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qiu Qiu & Liping Dai & Helena F. M. W. Van Rijswick & Gang Tu, 2021. "Improving the Water Quality Monitoring System in the Yangtze River Basin—Legal Suggestions to the Implementation of the Yangtze River Protection Law," Laws, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-13, April.
    2. Mengxue Ji & Zhenming Wu & Dandan Zhu, 2023. "Environmental Vertical Management and Enterprises’ Performance: Evidence from Water Pollution Reduction in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(19), pages 1-17, September.

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