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Some theoretical considerations regarding net asset values for money market funds

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The instability of money market mutual funds is a subject of active debate. A new regulatory framework is likely to be implemented soon in the United States. The design of such a framework should depend on an assessment of which is the main economic function fulfilled by these funds. If money funds are providing maturity transformation, then redemption values that permanently reflect the market value of assets may be hard to compute and may undermine the purpose of the funds. If funds are mainly investment managers, then market-based redemption values can be appropriate and increase the stability of the funds.

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  • Huberto M. Ennis, 2012. "Some theoretical considerations regarding net asset values for money market funds," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 98(4Q), pages 231-254.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2012:i:4q:p:231-254:n:v.98no.4
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    6. Patrick E. McCabe & Marco Cipriani & Michael Holscher & Antoine Martin, 2013. "The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 44(1 (Spring), pages 211-278.
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    Cited by:

    1. Parlatore, Cecilia, 2016. "Fragility in money market funds: Sponsor support and regulation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 595-623.
    2. Keister, Todd & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2023. "Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    3. Huberto M. Ennis & Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 2023. "Money Market Fund Reform: Dealing with the Fundamental Problem," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(1), pages 1-14, January.

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