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The Fed and Its Shadow: A Historical View

Author

Listed:
  • Charles M. Kahn
  • Stephen F. Quinn
  • William Roberds

Abstract

Central bank policies have always incorporated both a discretionary or active component and a passive component. Successful central banking has required a coordination of the two components. After a period of apparent dormancy, the passive component of monetary policy has emerged from the shadows and become relevant for Federal Reserve policy today.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles M. Kahn & Stephen F. Quinn & William Roberds, 2023. "The Fed and Its Shadow: A Historical View," Policy Hub, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 2023(6), pages 1-32, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:a00068:97141
    DOI: 10.29338/ph2023-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank; monetary policy; active; passive; repo; reverse repo;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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