Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement
AbstractStudies of voting patterns in the Council of the European Union (EU) have increased since voting records in this institution have become more readily available. This paper builds on earlier work and explores coalition-formation and voting in the Council of the EU for the EU-15 (i.e., between 1995 and 2004), by analyzing cleavage patterns based on voting records for this institution. Focusing on the pre-enlargement phase, the paper provides new insights into earlier member state voting behavior in the Council on the basis of a range of independent variables, including governments’ absolute and relative positions on the left-right policy dimension, pro-integration sentiments among domestic publics, governments’ positions as either net beneficiaries or net payers into the EU budget and finally, number of votes in the Council. In methodological terms, we treat vote decisions as panel data and report adjusted standard errors for country-based clusters, using ordered probit regression to explain the prope nsity of EU member states to vote ‘yes’, abstain from voting, or vote ‘no’ in the Council. The ordered probit analysis used to explore the potential relevance of these dimensions provides insights that at times confirm, but also partially contradict, earlier findings on this topic. We notably find strong evidence for a North-South cleavage pre-enlargement, a significant role for the Presidency and moderate evidence for the relevance of public opinion and government left-right positioning in Council voting behavior.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & GÃ©rard Roland, 2007. "Democratic politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7744, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Axel Moberg, 2002. "The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 259-282, 06.
- Adriaan Schout & Sophie Vanhoonacker, 2006. "Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU: Revisiting Nice," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44, pages 1051-1077, December.
- Madeleine O. Hosli & Mikko Mattila & Marc Uriot, 2011. "Voting in the Council of the European Union after the 2004 Enlargement: A Comparison of Old and New Member States," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(6), pages 1249-1270, November.
- Madeleine O. Hosli, 2012. "Negotiating the European Constitution: Government Preferences for Council Decision Rules," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 177-198, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lenka Stastna).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.