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The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma

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  • Premo, L.S.
  • Brown, Justin R.

Abstract

Previous work with the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma has shown that the ability to respond to a partner’s defection by simply “walking away†allows so-called walk away cooperators to outcompete defectors as well as cooperators that do not respond to defection. These findings are important because they suggest a relatively simple route by which cooperation can evolve. But it remains to be seen just how robust the walk away strategy is to ecologically important variables such as population density, strategic error, and offspring dispersal. The results of our simulation experiments show that the evolutionary success of walk away cooperators decreases with decreasing population density and/or with increasing error. This relationship is best explained by the ways in which population density and error jointly affect the opportunity cost of walking away. This opportunity cost also explains why naive cooperators regularly outcompete walk away cooperators in pair-wise competition, something not observed in previous studies. Our results further show that local offspring dispersal can inhibit the evolution of cooperation by negating the protection low population density affords the most vulnerable cooperators. Our research identifies socio-ecological conditions in which forgiveness trumps flight in the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma.

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  • Premo, L.S. & Brown, Justin R., 2019. "The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner’s dilemma," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 40-48.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:thpobi:v:127:y:2019:i:c:p:40-48
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2019.03.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Locodi, A.M. & O’Riordan, C., 2023. "The effects of varying game payoffs and lattice dimensionality on Prisoner’s Dilemma games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).

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