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Do local governments use business tax incentives to compensate for high business property taxes?

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  • Drucker, Joshua
  • Funderburg, Richard
  • Merriman, David
  • Weber, Rachel

Abstract

Why do municipalities set business property taxes higher than the costs of business services when, in competitive markets, this would result in the inefficient provision of public goods? Statutory tax rates may be set artificially high to allow selective reductions for targeted firms through incentives. We examine the nearly 2500 tax codes—sub-municipal geographic areas—that host business locations in 134 municipalities in Cook County, Illinois. We explain spatial variation in tax incentives as a function of the relative competitiveness of tax codes. Our findings suggest that municipalities apply property tax abatements to offset their own relatively uncompetitive tax rates but use Tax Increment Financing (TIF) incentives to engage in vertical competition in order to capture revenue from overlapping governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Drucker, Joshua & Funderburg, Richard & Merriman, David & Weber, Rachel, 2020. "Do local governments use business tax incentives to compensate for high business property taxes?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:81:y:2020:i:c:s0166046219300316
    DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2019.103498
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    Cited by:

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    2. Yugang Tang & Zhihao Su & Yilin Hou & Zhendong Yin, 2023. "Tax Streams, Land Rents and Urban Land Allocation," CESifo Working Paper Series 10812, CESifo.
    3. Richard Funderburg & Joshua Drucker & David Merriman & Rachel Weber, 2021. "Is Tax Competition Strategic? Spatial Distributions of Business Property Tax Abatements in the Chicago Suburbs," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 35(1), pages 66-83, February.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy

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