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Pension insurance schemes and moral hazard: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation should restrict the insured pension plans’ portfolio policy

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  • Romaniuk, Katarzyna

Abstract

The pension insurance schemes existence leads to moral hazard: the insured defined benefit pension plans tend to invest more heavily in risky assets. A possible countermeasure mentioned in the literature, but not yet analyzed, is the introduction of a restriction on the pension plans’ portfolio policy. The US context is chosen for analysis. We argue that a portfolio restriction is needed in the case of a sponsoring firm in financial difficulty having an underfunded pension plan. We prove that the restriction should respond to the objective of liability hedging. Estimation results suggest that the corresponding portfolio strategy is a low-risk policy. The paper recommends that the maximum equity proportion is fixed at 30%.

Suggested Citation

  • Romaniuk, Katarzyna, 2021. "Pension insurance schemes and moral hazard: The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation should restrict the insured pension plans’ portfolio policy," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 37-43.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:82:y:2021:i:c:p:37-43
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2021.06.015
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Defined benefit pension plan; Underfunding; Sponsor distress; PBGC; Pension insurance; Moral hazard; Regulation; Portfolio restriction; Liability hedge;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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