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Hyperbolic discounting and uniform savings floors

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  • Malin, Benjamin A.

Abstract

Previous research suggests that, in partial equilibrium, individuals whose decision-making exhibits a present-bias - such as hyperbolic discounters who tend to over-consume - will be in favor of having a floor imposed on their savings. In this paper, I show it is quite difficult for the introduction of a savings floor to be Pareto improving in general equilibrium. Indeed, a necessary condition for the floor to be Pareto improving is that it is high enough to be binding for all individuals. Even in that case, because the equilibrium interest rate adjusts with the level of the savings floor, some individuals may prefer to commit to a future time path of consumption by facing a high interest rate (and no floor) rather than a high floor. An essential insight for understanding this result is to note that even those with little self-control (in an absolute sense) will choose to save a lot when the interest rate is high enough.

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  • Malin, Benjamin A., 2008. "Hyperbolic discounting and uniform savings floors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1986-2002, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:10-11:p:1986-2002
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    8. Malin, Benjamin A., 2008. "Hyperbolic discounting and uniform savings floors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1986-2002, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Torben M. Andersen & Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2021. "Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 115-149, February.
    2. Marcelo Arbex & Enlinson Mattos, 2017. "Optimal Paternalistic Health and Human Capital Policies," Working Papers 1709, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
    3. Dan Anderberg & Helmut Rainer & Kerstin Roeder, 2016. "Family-Specific Investments and Divorce: A Theory of Dynamically Inconsistent Household Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 5996, CESifo.
    4. Malin, Benjamin A., 2008. "Hyperbolic discounting and uniform savings floors," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1986-2002, October.
    5. Makoto Nakajima, 2012. "Rising indebtedness and temptation: A welfare analysis," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), pages 257-288, July.
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    7. Anderberg, Dan & Rainer, Helmut & Roeder, Kerstin, 2018. "Family-specific investments and divorce with dynamically inconsistent households: Marital contracts and policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 199-225.
    8. Makoto Nakajima, 2013. "A tale of two commitments: equilibrium default and temptation," Working Papers 14-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Takayuki Ogawa & Hiroaki Ohno, 2024. "Hyperbolic discounting and state‐dependent commitment," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(362), pages 414-445, April.
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    11. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2022. "Present bias and externalities: Can government intervention raise welfare?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1480-1506, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hyperbolic discounting General equilibrium Commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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