The political economy of stabilization programmes in developing countries
AbstractThis report investigates the endogenous effects of the implementation of stabilization programmes (credits and different variants of conditionalities) in developing countries. A model is outlined, which at the same time builds on Modern Political Economy and New Institutional Economy and incorporates cognitive (psychological) aspects in decision making. Emphasizing the demand and supply of support for the government by the various interest groups and the population, this model helps to explain not only the programmes' effects on the standard of living, but also on the use of instruments by the groups involved. Especially, effects on the politicians' own consumption, the extent of corruption by bribery and the suppression of the population and particular groups are analysed. Conditions under which the economic and/or the political situations improve for the population are identified and corresponding testable propositions are formulated ... Ce rapport examine les effets endogÃ¨nes de la mise en Åuvre dans les pays en dÃ©veloppement de programmes de stabilisation (crÃ©dits et diffÃ©rentes formes de conditionalitÃ©). Un modÃ¨le est Ã©bauchÃ© Ã partir de l'Ãconomie politique moderne et de la Nouvelle Ã©conomie des institutions, tout en tenant compte des aspects cognitifs (psychologiques) du processus de prise de dÃ©cision. Mettant l'accent sur la demande et l'offre de soutien de la population et des divers groupes d'intÃ©rÃªt au gouvernement, ce modÃ¨le aide Ã expliquer non seulement les effets de tels programmes sur le niveau de vie, mais Ã©galement sur l'utilisation d'instruments par les groupes concernÃ©s. En particulier, sont analysÃ©s les effets sur la consommation des Ã©lites politiques, sur l'importance de la corruption, et sur les politiques rÃ©pressives Ã l'Ã©gard de la population et de certains groupes. Les conditions qui tendent Ã permettre une meilleure situation Ã©conomique et/ou politique pour la population sont identifiÃ©es ...
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno S Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, 1992. "The Political Economy of Stabilization Programmes in Developing Countries," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 59, OECD Publishing.
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