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Atomic routing in a deterministic queuing model

Author

Listed:
  • Werth, T.L.
  • Holzhauser, M.
  • Krumke, S.O.

Abstract

The issue of selfish routing through a network has received a lot of attention in recent years. We study an atomic dynamic routing scenario, where players allocate resources with load dependent costs only for some limited time.

Suggested Citation

  • Werth, T.L. & Holzhauser, M. & Krumke, S.O., 2014. "Atomic routing in a deterministic queuing model," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 18-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:oprepe:v:1:y:2014:i:1:p:18-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2014.05.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
    2. José R. Correa & Andreas S. Schulz & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses, 2007. "Fast, Fair, and Efficient Flows in Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 215-225, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hugo E. Silva & Robin Lindsey & André de Palma & Vincent A. C. van den Berg, 2017. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Bottleneck Model with Atomic Users," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 863-881, August.

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