Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 4 (1983)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Koster, R. de & Peters, H. & Tijs, S.H. & Wakker, P., 1983. "Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154284, Tilburg University.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005.
"On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents,"
eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.