IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/matsoc/v103y2020icp59-68.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the properties that characterize privacy

Author

Listed:
  • Gilboa-Freedman, Gail
  • Smorodinsky, Rann

Abstract

Privacy, in the sense of control over access to one’s personal information, is a central concern in the context of online decision making, both in general and in relation to online platforms in particular. For at least some agents, a belief that one online platform jeopardizes users’ privacy more than another may tip the scales in favor of the latter. Thus, understanding how privacy considerations come into play is central for any economic or social analysis. To this end, we study how agents rank online platforms (or mechanisms, as we call them) from a privacy perspective. We propose a very simple model of privacy-jeopardizing mechanisms, along with a normative methodology for understanding how these mechanisms are ranked. Similarly to classic work in decision theory, we postulate several axioms that we believe a privacy order should satisfy, and then characterize the set of orders that comply with these axioms. These orders turn out to be related to the notion of f-divergence from information theory, one example of which is KL divergence. We test the usefulness of our theoretical result by using it to rank clustering models based on data provided by the Recommendation Team at Microsoft Research.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilboa-Freedman, Gail & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2020. "On the properties that characterize privacy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 59-68.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:103:y:2020:i:c:p:59-68
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489619300903
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.11.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Alessandro Acquisti & Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2016. "The Economics of Privacy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(2), pages 442-492, June.
    3. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 328-328.
    4. Duncan, George & Lambert, Diane, 1989. "The Risk of Disclosure for Microdata," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 7(2), pages 207-217, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1039-1089 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Henry S. Farber, 1984. "The Analysis of Union Behavior," NBER Working Papers 1502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    5. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    6. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core," Working Papers 1817, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    7. Zhao, Guo, 2015. "Dynamic Games under Bounded Rationality," MPRA Paper 62688, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    9. Robert Shelburne, 2006. "A Utilitarian Welfare Analysis of Trade Liberalization," ECE Discussion Papers Series 2006_4, UNECE.
    10. Daske, Thomas, 2021. "The Incentive Costs of Welfare Judgments," EconStor Preprints 230318, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    11. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    12. M. Hinojosa & A. Mármol & J. Zarzuelo, 2008. "Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 597-618, December.
    13. Matsui, Kenji, 2020. "Optimal bargaining timing of a wholesale price for a manufacturer with a retailer in a dual-channel supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 287(1), pages 225-236.
    14. Csaba, László, 2014. "Átmenettan és közgazdaságtan. Módszertani tanulságok egy részterület műveléséből [Transitology" and economics. Methodological lessons to be drawn from work in a partial territory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 53-67.
    15. Simon G�chter & Arno Riedl, "undated". "Moral Property Rights in Bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 113, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. J. K. Pappalardo, 2022. "Economics of Consumer Protection: Contributions and Challenges in Estimating Consumer Injury and Evaluating Consumer Protection Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 201-238, June.
    17. H Peyton Young, 2014. "The Evolution of Social Norms," Economics Series Working Papers 726, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    18. Erkki Koskela & Ronnie Schöb, 2002. "Alleviating Unemployment: The Case for Green Tax Reforms," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 20, pages 355-378, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Magni, Carlo Alberto, 2009. "Splitting up value: A critical review of residual income theories," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 198(1), pages 1-22, October.
    20. Stefano Vannucci, 2015. "La teoria dei giochi e John Nash," Department of Economics University of Siena 722, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    21. Roland Kirstein & Matthias Peiss, 2013. "Quantitative Machtkonzepte in der Ökonomik," FEMM Working Papers 130004, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:103:y:2020:i:c:p:59-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.