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Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences

Author

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  • Chen, Ning
  • Li, Mengling

Abstract

This paper studies the two-sided matching problem with multi-unit capacities and weak preferences on both sides. The simultaneous presence of these two features complicates the problem greatly, because either can make a stable matching not necessarily Pareto efficient. To ensure both fairness and efficiency, a natural solution is Pareto stability, which requires both pairwise stability and Pareto efficiency. We introduce a computationally efficient algorithm to construct a Pareto stable matching. This result immediately implies the existence of a Pareto stable matching in the general many-to-many matching problem with weak preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Ning & Li, Mengling, 2019. "Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 272-284.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:272-284
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yajing & Jiao, Zhenhua & Zhang, Yang & Zhao, Fang, 2021. "Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    2. Li, Mengling, 2020. "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 354-384.
    3. Fisher, James C.D., 2020. "Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 136-140.

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