Fisher's behaviour with individual vessel quotas--Over-capacity and potential rent: Five case studies
AbstractInternationally, individual vessel quotas (IVQ) have become an increasingly popular management tool. The main attraction of IVQs is the incentives they create for cost savings, autonomous capacity adjustment and, subsequently, rent generation. In this paper, the extent to which different IVQ systems have facilitated resource rent generation and capacity adjustment in five European countries--Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the UK--is examined. The potential economic rents and the capacity reduction necessary to achieve these rents in each of the fisheries are also estimated. Reasons why IVQs have not achieved their potential economic benefits in these fisheries are also examined.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Fisheries management Resource rent Over-capacity Individual vessel quotas Incentives;
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- Sigbjorn Tveteras & Carlos Paredes & Julio Peña, 2011. "Individual Fishing Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv263, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
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