Central bank accountability and independence: Are they inconsistent?
AbstractThe language of discretion offers little information about monetary policy beyond the assurance that policymakers always “do the right thing at the right time”. This language renders problematic the reconciliation of central bank independence with accountability. Monetary policymakers should articulate an analytical framework using the language of economics that allows them to respond to the question, “What variables does the central bank control and how does it exercise that control”.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617
Central bank; Monetary policy; Political economy of money; Federal Reserve System;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert L. Hetzel, 2008. "What is the monetary standard, or, how did the Volcker-Greenspan FOMCs tame inflation?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 147-171.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
- Robert L. Hetzel, 2006. "Making the systematic part of monetary policy transparent," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 255-290.
- Selgin, George & Lastrapes, William D. & White, Lawrence H., 2012. "Has the Fed been a failure?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 569-596.
- Marvin Goodfriend, 1993.
"Interest rate policy and the inflation scare problem: 1979-1992,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 1-24.
- Marvin Goodfriend, 1993. "Interest rate policy and the inflation scare problem: 1979-1992," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Steven Ambler, 2014. "Price-Level Targeting: A Post-Mortem?," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 400, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.