IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jetheo/v68y1996i1p234-248.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game

Author

Listed:
  • Cressman, R.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Cressman, R., 1996. "Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 234-248, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:1:p:234-248
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(96)90012-5
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
    2. repec:fth:calaec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Lindgren, Kristian & Verendel, Vilhelm, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma--The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," MPRA Paper 43662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
    5. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
    6. Sandholm, William H. & Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2019. "Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
    7. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 187-214, June.
    8. Yangbo Song & Mofei Zhao, 2023. "Cooperative teaching and learning of actions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1289-1327, November.
    9. Bernergård, Axel & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 82-97.
    10. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Mathias Spichtig & Martijn Egas, 2019. "When and How Does Mutation-Generated Variation Promote the Evolution of Cooperation?," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-17, January.
    12. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.
    13. repec:cdl:ucsbec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Benjamin M Zagorsky & Johannes G Reiter & Krishnendu Chatterjee & Martin A Nowak, 2013. "Forgiver Triumphs in Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(12), pages 1-8, December.
    15. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1999. "Reputation versus Social Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 40-59, September.
    16. Xin Wang & Jing Han & Huawei Han, 2011. "Special Agents Can Promote Cooperation in the Population," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(12), pages 1-9, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:1:p:234-248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.