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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 11 (1984)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 327-346
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:11:y:1984:i:4:p:327-346

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