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No free shop: Why target companies sometimes choose not to buy ‘go-shop’ options

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  • Antoniades, Adonis
  • Calomiris, Charles W.
  • Hitscherich, Donna M.

Abstract

We study the decisions by targets in private equity and MBO transactions whether to actively “shop” executed merger agreements prior to shareholder approval. Targets can negotiate for a ‘go-shop' clause, which permits the solicitation of offers from other would-be acquirors during the “go-shop” window and may lower the termination fee paid by the target in the event of a competing bid. The decision to retain the option to shop is predicted by various firm attributes, including larger size and more fragmented ownership. Go-shops are not a free option. We exploit the impact of various characteristics of the firm’s legal advisory team and procedures on the probability of inclusion of a go-shop provision to establish a negative relationship between go-shop provisions and initial acquisition premia. Importantly, that loss to shareholder value is not offset by gains associated with new competing offers. We conclude that the increased-use of go-shops reflects excessive concerns about litigation risks, possibly resulting from lawyers’ conflicts of interest in advising targets.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoniades, Adonis & Calomiris, Charles W. & Hitscherich, Donna M., 2016. "No free shop: Why target companies sometimes choose not to buy ‘go-shop’ options," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 36-64.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:88:y:2016:i:c:p:36-64
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2016.07.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private equity; Management buyouts; Mergers; Acquisitions; Offer premium; Cumulative abnormal returns; Conflicts; Litigation risk; Lawyers; Merger agreements; Go-shop; Special committee;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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