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The competitive enforcement of property rights in medieval Japan: The role of temples and monasteries

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  • Adolphson, Mikael
  • Ramseyer, J. Mark

Abstract

Medieval Japanese governments only haphazardly enforced claims to scarce resources. Necessarily, this presented landholders with a void. To obtain the enforcement they needed, many turned to institutions affiliated with the fractious Buddhist faith instead. Temples and monasteries enjoyed an exemption from tax on their lands and controlled an array of financial and human resources with which they could adjudicate and enforce claims to scarce resources. To obtain access to that exemption and those resources, landholders "commended" their rights in land to them, and paid them a share of the harvest. In exchange, the temples and monasteries exempted them from tax, adjudicated disputes internal to the estate and protected their estates against external threats. Effectively, the temples and monasteries competed in a market for basic governmental services. By helping to secure basic claims to property, the temples and monasteries helped to promote investment and growth; by competing against the government itself, they helped to forestall the crippling effect of a predatory monopolistic state.

Suggested Citation

  • Adolphson, Mikael & Ramseyer, J. Mark, 2009. "The competitive enforcement of property rights in medieval Japan: The role of temples and monasteries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 660-668, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:3:p:660-668
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Skarbek, 2017. "Self-governance, property rights, and illicit commerce," Chapters, in: Todd J. Zywicki & Peter J. Boettke (ed.), Research Handbook on Austrian Law and Economics, chapter 8, pages 178-191, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Peter T. Leeson, 2014. ""God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 193-216.
    3. Vladimir V. Maltsev, 2022. "Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 433-444, December.
    4. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    5. Georg D. Blind & Raji Steineck, 2021. "The missing piece in E. Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms: the economy," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 291-315, April.
    6. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
    7. Stringham, Edward Peter & Zywicki, Todd J., 2011. "Hayekian anarchism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 290-301, May.
    8. Skarbek, David, 2011. "Governance and Prison Gangs," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 702-716, November.

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    Keywords

    Property rights Medieval Japan;

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