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Competition, risk neutrality and loan commitments Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Boot, Arnoud
Thakor, Anjan V.
Udell, Gregory F.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance .
Volume (Year): 11 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 449-471
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:11:y:1987:i:3:p:449-471Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf
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Melnik, Arie & Plaut, Steven E., 1986.
"The economics of loan commitment contracts: Credit pricing and utilization ,"
Journal of Banking & Finance ,
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Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981.
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American Economic Review ,
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Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979.
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Ramakrishnan, Ram T S & Thakor, Anjan V, 1984.
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Chan, Yuk-Shee & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987.
" Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information ,"
Journal of Finance ,
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Other versions: Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1976.
"Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 651-66, November.
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Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1987.
"An economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments ,"
Journal of Banking & Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 271-289, June.
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Other versions: Campbell, Tim S, 1978.
"A Model of the Market for Lines of Credit ,"
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Ozgur Emre Ergungor, 2000.
"Relationship loans and information exploitability in a competitive market: loan commitments vs. spot loans ,"
Working Paper
0013, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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Evan Gatev & Philip E. Strahan, 2003.
"Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market ,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
03-01, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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George Sofianos & Arie Melnik & Paul Wachtel, 1991.
"Loan Commitments and Monetary Policy ,"
NBER Working Papers
2232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Sangkyun Park, 1997.
"Option value of credit lines as an explanation of high credit card rates ,"
Research Paper
9702, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Dominik Egli & Steven Ongena & David C. Smith, 2002.
"On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance ,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
718, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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Other versions:
Egli, D. & Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C., 2001.
"On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance ,"
Discussion Paper
1, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!] Egli, Dominik & Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2006.
"On the sequencing of projects, reputation building, and relationship finance ,"
Finance Research Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 23-39, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2004.
"Debt maturity, risk, and asymmetric information ,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2004-60, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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Other versions:
Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2004.
"Debt maturity, risk, and asymmetric information ,"
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2004-32, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
[Downloadable!] Marco Espinosa-Vega & Allen N. Berger & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2005.
"Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information ,"
IMF Working Papers
05/201, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!] Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2005.
"Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2895-2923, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Sumit Agarwal & Souphala Chomsisengphet & John C. Driscoll, 2004.
"Loan commitments and private firms ,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2004-27, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
[Downloadable!]
Evan Gatev & Philip E. Strahan, 2003.
"Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market ,"
NBER Working Papers
9956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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