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Clinching auctions with online supply

Author

Listed:
  • Goel, Gagan
  • Mirrokni, Vahab
  • Paes Leme, Renato

Abstract

Auctions for perishable goods such as Internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. In this work, we consider a multi-unit model where buyers have global budget constraints, and the supply arrives in an online manner. Our main contribution is to show that for this setting there is an individually-rational, incentive-compatible and Pareto-optimal auction that allocates these units and calculates prices on the fly, without knowledge of the total supply. We do so by showing that the Adaptive Clinching Auction satisfies a supply-monotonicity property.

Suggested Citation

  • Goel, Gagan & Mirrokni, Vahab & Paes Leme, Renato, 2020. "Clinching auctions with online supply," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 342-358.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:342-358
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sushil Bikhchandani & Sven de Vries & James Schummer & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2011. "An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(2), pages 400-413, April.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    3. Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction design; Online allocation; Online supply;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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