IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v89y2023ics1057521923002326.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Government audit supervision, financialization, and executives' excess perks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises

Author

Listed:
  • Zhang, Mengtao
  • Li, Wenwen
  • Luo, Yalin
  • Chen, Wenchuan

Abstract

In recent years, the phenomenon of corporate financialization has become increasingly prevalent in China. This paper uses data from Chinese state-owned listed firms from 2006 to 2018 to investigate whether large-scale financial investments by companies facilitate executives' excess perk consumption, and whether government auditing, as an important component of the national governance system, can play a governance role in this behavior. The results show that corporate financialization behavior significantly exacerbates executives' excess perks, and government auditing can mitigate the effect of corporate financialization on executives' excess perk consumption. We find that increased cash flow is the mechanism by which financialization behavior positively affects executives' excess perks. Furthermore, this study reveals that the implicit corruption of state-owned enterprise executives through corporate financialization is primarily based on compensation psychology, which will reduce the effectiveness of monetary compensation contracts. However, government auditing can effectively constrain this influence.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Mengtao & Li, Wenwen & Luo, Yalin & Chen, Wenchuan, 2023. "Government audit supervision, financialization, and executives' excess perks: Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923002326
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102716
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923002326
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102716?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Wulf, Julie, 2006. "Are perks purely managerial excess?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-33, January.
    2. Demir, FIrat, 2009. "Financial liberalization, private investment and portfolio choice: Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 314-324, March.
    3. Allen, Franklin & Qian, Yiming & Tu, Guoqian & Yu, Frank, 2019. "Entrusted loans: A close look at China's shadow banking system," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 18-41.
    4. Kong, Dongmin & Pan, Yue & Tian, Gary Gang & Zhang, Pengdong, 2020. "CEOs' hometown connections and access to trade credit: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    5. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    6. Engelbert Stockhammer, 2004. "Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 28(5), pages 719-741, September.
    7. Adam L. Steinbach & Tim R. Holcomb & R. Michael Holmes Jr. & Cynthia E. Devers & Albert A. Cannella Jr., 2017. "Top management team incentive heterogeneity, strategic investment behavior, and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(8), pages 1701-1720, August.
    8. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    9. Clara Xiaoling Chen & Hai Lu & Theodore Sougiannis, 2012. "The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 252-282, March.
    10. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June.
    11. Lin, Xiaowei & Zhang, Qihao & Chen, Aihua & Zhang, Pengdong, 2022. "The Bright Side of Financial Constraint on Corporate Innovation: Evidence from the Chinese Bond Market," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    12. Lin, Nan & Liu, Chengyi & Chen, Sicen & Pan, Jianping & Zhang, Pengdong, 2022. "The monitoring role of venture capital on controllers' tunneling: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    13. Imad A. Moosa, 2018. "Does financialization retard growth? Time series and cross-sectional evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(31), pages 3405-3415, July.
    14. Li, Bin & Yao, Yao & Shahab, Yasir & Li, Hai-Xia & Ntim, Collins G., 2020. "Parent-subsidiary dispersion and executive excess perks consumption," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    15. Huang, Bingbing & Cui, Yuying & Chan, Kam C., 2022. "Firm-level financialization: Contributing factors, sources, and economic consequences," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1153-1162.
    16. Brett Fiebiger, 2016. "Rethinking the Financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations: A Reappraisal of US Empirical Data," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 354-379, July.
    17. Adair Morse & Vikram Nanda & Amit Seru, 2011. "Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(5), pages 1779-1821, October.
    18. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    19. Hongbin Cai & Hanming Fang & Lixin Colin Xu, 2011. "Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 55-78.
    20. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    21. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-264, April.
    22. Pan, Yue & Shroff, Nemit & Zhang, Pengdong, 2023. "The dark side of audit market competition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1).
    23. Lin, Nan & Chen, Han & Zhang, Pengdong & Liu, Weiqian, 2022. "Does gambling culture affect firms’ investment efficiency?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    24. Eckhard Hein, 2019. "Financialisation and tendencies towards stagnation: the role of macroeconomic regime changes in the course of and after the financial and economic crisis 2007–09," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 43(4), pages 975-999.
    25. Luo, Wei & Zhang, Yi & Zhu, Ning, 2011. "Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 352-370, April.
    26. Yaniv Grinstein & David Weinbaum & Nir Yehuda, 2017. "The Economic Consequences of Perk Disclosure," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(4), pages 1812-1842, December.
    27. Sicen Chen & Shuping Lin & Jinli Xiao & Pengdong Zhang, 2022. "Do managers learn from stock prices in emerging markets? Evidence from China," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4-5), pages 377-396, March.
    28. Zhang, Jinjin & Chen, Huili & Zhang, Pengdong & Jiang, Min, 2022. "Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: An agency theory explanation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    29. Martin Bugeja & Meiting Lu & Yaowen Shan, 2015. "Cost Stickiness in Australia: Characteristics and Determinants," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 25(3), pages 248-261, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhao, Lei & Li, Na & Wu, Yanjun, 2023. "Institutional investors' site visits, information asymmetry, and investment efficiency," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Pan, Di & Chen, Wenchuan & Zhang, Jinjin & Fang, Hongrui, 2023. "Government accounting supervision and excessive perk consumption of executives: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    3. Xu, Nianhang & Li, Xiaorong & Yuan, Qingbo & Chan, Kam C., 2014. "Excess perks and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 419-434.
    4. Huang, Dayan & Kou, Aiju & Liu, Chengyi & Liu, Shanmin, 2023. "The effect of PWS arrangements on M&A activities," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    5. Liu, Huan & Hou, Canran, 2023. "The external effect of institutional cross-ownership on excessive managerial perks," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 483-501.
    6. Zhang, Jinjin & Chen, Huili & Zhang, Pengdong & Jiang, Min, 2022. "Product market competition and the value of corporate cash: An agency theory explanation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    7. Xiaoyi Ren & Xing Liu & Zongtao Tian, 2020. "Excess perks in SOEs: evidence from China," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 34(2), pages 152-165, November.
    8. Zuo, Ying & Xu, Weidong & Li, Donghui & Fu, Wentao & Lin, Bin, 2022. "Individualism and excess perk consumption: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    9. Jian, Jianhui & Li, Huaqian & Meng, Leah & Zhao, Chunxiang, 2020. "Do policy burdens induce excessive managerial perks? Evidence from China’s stated-owned enterprises," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 54-65.
    10. Zhi Su & Bo Yi & Linan Wang, 2022. "Is corporate philanthropy a pretext for executives' excess perk consumption? Evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 4010-4027, December.
    11. Chia-Ying Chan & Iftekhar Hasan & Chih-Yung Lin, 2021. "Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1221-1258, May.
    12. Hua Zhang & Yuanyang Song & Yuan Ding, 2015. "What Drives Managerial Perks? An Empirical Test of Competing Theoretical Perspectives," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(2), pages 259-275, December.
    13. Ting, Hsiu-I & Huang, Po-Kai, 2018. "CEOs’ power and perks: Evidence from Chinese banks," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 19-27.
    14. Steve Sauerwald & Zhiang (John) Lin & Mike W. Peng, 2016. "Board social capital and excess CEO returns," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 498-520, March.
    15. Lou, Xu & Qian, Aimin & Zhang, Chenyu, 2021. "Do CEO's political promotion incentives influence the value of cash holdings: Evidence from state-owned enterprises in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    16. Lin, Xiaowei & Li, Ao & Zhang, Pengdong & Chen, Wenchuan, 2023. "The disciplinary role of product market competition on cash holding," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 653-671.
    17. Zhang, Shanshan & Liu, Chang, 2020. "State ownership and the structuring of lease arrangements," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    18. Bradley W. Benson & Wallace N. Davidson III & Hongxia Wang & Dan L. Worrell, 2011. "Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management, Firm Value, and Corporate Governance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 40(1), pages 39-81, March.
    19. Leila E. Davis, 2017. "Financialization And Investment: A Survey Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(5), pages 1332-1358, December.
    20. Liu, Lihua & Shu, Haicheng, 2022. "Mandatory dividend policy and perk consumption: Evidence from state-owned business groups in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:89:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923002326. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.