Paying back to borrow more: Reputation and bank credit access in early America
AbstractThe birth of commercial banking in New England after the American Revolution provides an important case to examine banking development under asymmetric information. Similar to credit markets in developing countries today, bank borrowers of early America usually had little or no collateral. This paper uses a unique data set based on loans between 1803 and 1833 for Plymouth Bank to examine bank lending policies in the absence of collateral. Empirical evidence suggests that borrowers with little collateral established their credit-worthiness through repeated interaction with banks.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.
Volume (Year): 45 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830
Banking Collateral Reputation Lending;
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