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Are climate change policies politically costly?

Author

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  • Furceri, Davide
  • Ganslmeier, Michael
  • Ostry, Jonathan

Abstract

Are policies designed to avert climate change (Climate Change Policies, or CCPs) politically costly? Using data on governmental popular support and the OECD's Environmental Stringency Index covering 30 countries between 2001 and 2015, our results show that CCPs are not necessarily politically costly: policy design matters. First, in contrast to non-market-based CCPs (such as emission limits), only market-based CCPs (such as emission taxes) entail political costs for the government. Second, the effects are only present when CCPs are adopted during periods of high oil prices, prior to elections, or in countries depending strongly on non-green (dirty) energy sources. Third, CCPs are only politically costly when inequality is high and/or social insurance/transfer does not sufficiently address the regressivity of CCPs. Our results are robust to numerous robustness checks including to address concerns related to endogeneity issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Furceri, Davide & Ganslmeier, Michael & Ostry, Jonathan, 2023. "Are climate change policies politically costly?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:178:y:2023:i:c:s030142152300160x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2023.113575
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Sommer & Théo Konc & Stefan Drews, 2023. "How resilient is public support for carbon pricing? Longitudinal evidence from Germany," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0021, Berlin School of Economics.
    2. Sommer, Stephan & Konc, Théo & Drews, Stefan, 2023. "How Resilient is Public Support for Carbon Pricing? Longitudinal Evidence from Germany," Ruhr Economic Papers 1017, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change policies; Climate change; Political support; Political cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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