IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v27y1988i1p73-77.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A non-parametric test of a first-order Markov process for regimes in a non-cooperatively collusive industry

Author

Listed:
  • Berry, Steven
  • Briggs, Hugh

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Berry, Steven & Briggs, Hugh, 1988. "A non-parametric test of a first-order Markov process for regimes in a non-cooperatively collusive industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 73-77.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:27:y:1988:i:1:p:73-77
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(88)90222-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo M. Zeidan, 2011. "Tacit Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in the Canadian Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 3623, CESifo.
    2. Vassilis A. Hajivassiliou, 1990. "Testing Game Theoretic Models of Price-Fixing Behaviour," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 935, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Adam Rosen, 2007. "Identification and estimation of firms' marginal cost functions with incomplete knowledge of strategic behavior," CeMMAP working papers CWP03/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    4. V A Hajivassiliou, 2019. "Switching Regressions with Imperfect Regime Classification Information: Theory and Applications," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series 610, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. John M. Connor, 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," Working Papers 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    6. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    7. David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:27:y:1988:i:1:p:73-77. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.