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When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion

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  • Wong, Tsz-Ning
  • Yang, Lily Ling

Abstract

We study a persuasion game between a decision maker and an expert. Before communication, the expert searches for an evidence about the state of nature. Higher effort leads to a higher probability of discovery. We show that, contrary to everyday experiences, monitoring of effort is always suboptimal if the expert’s bias is large, yet sometimes optimal if the expert’s bias is small.

Suggested Citation

  • Wong, Tsz-Ning & Yang, Lily Ling, 2018. "When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 186-189.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:163:y:2018:i:c:p:186-189
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emeric Henry, 2009. "Strategic Disclosure of Research Results: The Cost of Proving Your Honesty," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1036-1064, July.
    2. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2013. "Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(3), pages 522-544, September.
    3. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    5. Sourav Bhattacharya & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Strategic Information Revelation when Experts Compete to Influence," Working Paper 453, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2013.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Working Papers of BETA 2021-40, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information acquisition; Persuasion; Voluntary disclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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