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Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks

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  • Liu, Chen
  • Shi, Juan
  • Li, Tong
  • Liu, Jinzhuo

Abstract

In realistic world, the role or influence of each individual is heterogeneous and usually varies according to surroundings. Inspired by this fact, here we study the emergence of cooperative behavior in weighted networks under the coevolution of game strategy and node weight, where the node weight is used to mimic the role or influence of subjects. In the prisoner's dilemma, if an individual's fitness exceeds the aspiration level, its weight becomes larger; otherwise weight decreases. While such an adjustment of weight is defined by the intensity parameter δ, it is interesting that there is an optimal range for δ guaranteeing the best evolution of cooperation. The facilitation of cooperative behavior mainly depends on the weight distribution of players, which is based on the formation of a cooperative cluster controlled by high-weight cooperators. These cooperators are able to prevail against defectors even when there is a large temptation to defect. Our research provides a viable route to resolve social dilemma and will inspire further applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Chen & Shi, Juan & Li, Tong & Liu, Jinzhuo, 2019. "Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 342(C), pages 247-254.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:342:y:2019:i:c:p:247-254
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.09.034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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