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Sequential Auctions with Informational Externalities and Aversion to Price Risk: Decreasing and Increasing Price Sequences

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  • Claudio Mezzetti

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  • Claudio Mezzetti, 2011. "Sequential Auctions with Informational Externalities and Aversion to Price Risk: Decreasing and Increasing Price Sequences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(555), pages 990-1016, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:121:y:2011:i:555:p:990-1016
    DOI: j.1468-0297.2011.02438.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John, 2021. "Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    2. Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2022. "Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 7(1), pages 45-69, December.
    3. Hu, Audrey & Zou, Liang, 2015. "Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 319-335.
    4. Jim Ingebretsen Carlson, 2020. "A speedy auction using approximated bidders’ preferences," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 288(1), pages 65-93, May.
    5. Muramoto, Akitoshi & Sano, Ryuji, 2016. "Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 49-51.
    6. Rosato, Antonio, 2023. "Loss aversion in sequential auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), May.
    7. Matt Van Essen & John Wooders, 2023. "Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1069-1114, November.
    8. Rosato, Antonio, 2014. "Loss Aversion in Sequential Auctions: Endogenous Interdependence, Informational Externalities and the "Afternoon Effect"," MPRA Paper 56824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson, 2017. "Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 39-55, December.
    10. Regina Betz & Ben Greiner & Sascha Schweitzer & Stefan Seifert, 2017. "Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 351-371, October.
    11. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2014. "Sequential Auctions, Price Trends, and Risk Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-139/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Sumit Agarwal & Jing Li & Ernie Teo & Alan Cheong, 2018. "Strategic Sequential Bidding for Government Land Auction Sales – Evidence from Singapore," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 535-565, November.
    13. Van Essen, Matt & Wooders, John, 2016. "Dissolving a partnership dynamically," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 212-241.
    14. Sanna Laksa & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Morning-Fresh: Declining Prices and the Right-to-Choose in a Faroese Fish Market," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1141, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    15. Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, 2016. "Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-016/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    16. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021. "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    17. Fanqi Shi & Yiqing Xing, 2022. "Implementing optimal outcomes through sequential auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 703-732, December.
    18. Vishnu V. Narayan & Enguerrand Prebet & Adrian Vetta, 2019. "The Declining Price Anomaly is not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is)," Papers 1905.00853, arXiv.org.

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