Feature: Employment Protection Legislation
AbstractEmployment protection legislation (EPL) is an important labour market policy whose strictness differs greatly across OECD countries. The collection of articles in this Feature provides new theoretical and empirical results which highlight the impact of EPL on productivity, job and firm turnover, (un)employment and the incidence of temporary contracts. Importantly, the effect of EPL is shown to differ across types of workers and firms. This yields new insights on the incentives for labour market reform. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 117 (2007)
Issue (Month): 521 (06)
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- Leo Kaas & Philipp Kircher, 2011.
"Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market,"
Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz
2011-01, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
- Philipp Kircher & Leo Kaas, 2010. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," 2010 Meeting Papers 89, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Leo Kaas & Philipp Kircher, 2011. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 3336, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kaas, Leo & Kircher, Philipp, 2011. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," IZA Discussion Papers 5452, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Philipp Kircher & Leo Kaas, 2013. "Efficient firm dynamics in a frictional labor market," 2013 Meeting Papers 160, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00203176 is not listed on IDEAS
- Olivier Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass," NBER Working Papers 10443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gebhard Flaig & Horst Rottmann, 2011.
"Labour Market Institutions and Unemployment. An International Comparison,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
3558, CESifo Group Munich.
- Rottmann, Horst & Flaig, Gebhard, 2011. "Labour market institutions and unemployment: An international comparison," OTH im Dialog: Weidener Diskussionspapiere 31, University of Applied Sciences Amberg-Weiden (OTH).
- Julien Prat & Gabriel Felbermayr, 2007.
"Product Market Regulation, Firm Selection and Unemployment,"
2007 Meeting Papers
667, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gabriel Felbermayr & Julien Prat, 2011. "Product Market Regulation, Firm Selection, And Unemployment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 278-317, 04.
- Felbermayr, Gabriel & Prat, Julien, 2007. "Product Market Regulation, Firm Selection and Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 2754, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Felbermayr, Gabriel & Prat, Julien, 2011. "Product market regulation, Firm Selection, and Unemployment," Munich Reprints in Economics 20593, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Blanchard, Olivier & Tirole, Jean, 2006.
"The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass,"
IDEI Working Papers
258, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Olivier J. Blanchard & Jean Tirole, 2008. "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection: A First Pass," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 45-77, 03.
- Blanchard, Olivier J & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "The Joint Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First Pass," CEPR Discussion Papers 6127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, 2010.
"Who Pays for it? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation,"
CSEF Working Papers
265, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 13 May 2012.
- Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, 2013. "Who Pays for it? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1236-1278, December.
- Leonardi, Marco & Pica, Giovanni, 2010. "Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation," IZA Discussion Papers 5335, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Marco Leonardi & Giovanni Pica, 2012. "Who pays for it? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation," Working Papers 436, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefano Bonini & Senem Alkan, 2012. "The political and legal determinants of venture capital investments around the world," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 997-1016, November.
- Albert van der Horst & Hugo Rojas-Romagosa & Leon Bettendorf, 2009. "Does employment affect productivity?," CPB Discussion Paper 119, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2007.
"Multiple Equilibria in a Firing Game With Impartial Justice,"
ESSEC Working Papers
DR 07025, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2009. "Multiple equilibria in a firing game with impartial justice," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 262-271, June.
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