The Rise and Fall of Unionised Labour Markets: A Political Economy Approach
Abstract
Studying a model where trade unions interact with endogenously formed partisan political parties, we explain changing political preferences for and against the unionised labour market regime. We focus on the changes in coalition formation between unskilled and moderately skilled workers, which in turn depend on inequality among workers. When inequality is either very low or very high, moderately skilled workers form a political coalition with unskilled workers to support a unionised labour market regime. In other cases, the economic interest of the moderately skilled workers is more in line with that of highly skilled workers and capital owners to support a competitive labour market regime. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 115 (2005)
Issue (Month): 500 (01)
Pages: 28-67
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Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
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Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Indraneel Dasgupta, .
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Discussion Papers
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- Dasgupta, Indraneel, 2009. "'Living' wage, class conflict and ethnic strife," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 750-765, November.
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"Redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions,"
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"Immigration policy with partisan parties,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 134-142, February.
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"Equilibrium Social Insurance with Policy-Motivated Parties ,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2007. "Equilibrium social insurance with policy-motivated parties," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 624-640, September.
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- Xiujian Chen & Shu Lin & W. Robert Reed, 2006.
"Another Look at what to do with Time-series Cross-section Data,"
Working Papers in Economics
06/04, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Xiujian Chen & Shu Lin & W. Robert Reed, 2005. "Another Look At What To Do With Time-Series Cross-Section Data," Econometrics 0506004, EconWPA.
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"Distribution and Politics: A Brief History and Prospect,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1487, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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