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Privatization and Government's Preference under Mixed Oligopoly: A Generalization

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  • Kangsik Choi

    ()
    (Pusan National University)

Abstract

In this paper, we generalize Kato's (Economics Bulletin, 2008) model by allowing many private firms in the mixed oligopoly setting, rather than the mixed duopoly framework of Kato (2008). By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of mixed oligopoly, we show that Kato's results are robust when there are many private firms. That is, as the number of private firms increases, both total output and the government's payoff in the mixed oligopoly are larger than those in the private oligopoly if and only the weight of the government's preferences on tax revenues increases and vice versa.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I2-P35.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 861-866

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00040

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Related research

Keywords: Government's preference; social welfare; tax; privatization;

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  1. Rudra Sensarma & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(28), pages 1-10.
  2. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April.
  3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:40:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2008:i:28:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
  7. Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S., 2004. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firm's moves: the relevance of privatization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 411-416, June.
  8. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
  9. Mujumdar, Sudesh & Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 199-204, February.
  10. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
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Cited by:
  1. Choi, Kangsik, 2009. "Government's Preference and Timing of Endogenous Wage Setting: Perspectives on Privatization and Mixed Duopoly," MPRA Paper 17221, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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