The pattern of US antidumping: the path from initial filing to WTO dispute settlement
AbstractThis paper examines recent trends in the US antidumping process. We trace the experience of different groups of countries at each stage of the investigation process and through follow-up activity in disputes initiated at the GATT WTO. The data reveal that lower income developing countries are more likely to be targeted, less likely to settle cases, more likely to confront high dumping duties, and less likely to bring cases to the WTO. We argue that differences in administrative and institutional capacity may be a contributing factor that explains the observed bias facing developing countries, in addition to the other hypotheses that have been offered in the literature, such as higher protection and limited retaliatory ability.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal World Trade Review.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 03 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 2RU UK
Fax: +44 (0)1223 325150
Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_WTRProvider-Email:firstname.lastname@example.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bown, Chad P., 2005.
"Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3540, The World Bank.
- Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 515-555, 06.
- Morris E. Morkre & Dean Spinanger & Lien H. Tran, 2008. "Are Unfair Import Laws Unfair to Developing Countries: Evidence from U.S. Antidumping Actions 1990-2004," Kiel Working Papers 1438, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Chad P. Bown & Meredith Crowley, 2004.
"Policy externalities: how U.S. antidumping affects Japanese exports to the EU,"
Working Paper Series
WP-04-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2006. "Policy externalities: How US antidumping affects Japanese exports to the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 696-714, September.
- Miyagiwa, Kaz & Song, Huasheng & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2010.
"Innovation, antidumping, and retaliation,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7916, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- MIYAGIWA, Kaz & SONG, Huasheng & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke, 2010. "Innovation, antidumping and retaliation," CORE Discussion Papers 2010064, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Kaz Miyagiwa & Huasheng Song & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2010. "Innovation, Antidumping, and Retaliation," Emory Economics 1009, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.