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Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals

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  • Fernández-Vázquez, Pablo
  • Barberá, Pablo
  • Rivero, Gonzalo

Abstract

Corruption scandals have been found to have significant but mild electoral effects in the comparative literature (Golden 2006). However, most studies have assumed that voters punish all kinds of illegal practices. This article challenges this assumption by distinguishing between two types of corruption, according to the type of welfare consequences they have for the constituency. This hypothesis is tested using data from the 2011 Spanish local elections. We exploit the abundance of corruption allegations associated with the Spanish housing boom, which generated income gains for a wide segment of the electorate in the short term. We find that voters ignore corruption when there are side benefits to it, and that punishment is only administered in those cases in which they do not receive compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernández-Vázquez, Pablo & Barberá, Pablo & Rivero, Gonzalo, 2016. "Rooting Out Corruption or Rooting for Corruption? The Heterogeneous Electoral Consequences of Scandals," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 379-397, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:4:y:2016:i:02:p:379-397_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Montalvo, José G. & Piolatto, Amedeo & Raya, Josep, 2020. "Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    2. Leopoldo Fergusson & Arturo Harker & Carlos Molina & Juan Camilo Yamín, 2023. "Political incentives and corruption evidence from ghost students," Documentos CEDE 20732, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    3. Niklas Potrafke & Felix Roesel, 2019. "A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 231-265, January.
    4. Petr Wawrosz, 2022. "How Corruption Is and Should Be Investigated by Economic Theory," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-23, December.
    5. Beesley, Celeste & Hawkins, Darren, 2022. "Corruption, institutional trust and political engagement in Peru," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    6. Niklas Potrafke & Felix Rösel, 2016. "A Banana Republic? Trust in Electoral Institutions in Western Democracies - Evidence from a Presidential Election in Austria," CESifo Working Paper Series 6254, CESifo.
    7. Miguel Ángel Borrella-Mas & Martin Rode, 2021. "Love is blind: partisan alignment and political corruption in Spain," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 423-451, September.
    8. Nicholas Apergis & Mehmet Pinar, 2023. "Corruption and partisan polarization: evidence from the European Union," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 277-301, January.

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