Tariffs, Strategy, And Structure: Competition And Collusion In The Ontario Petroleum Industry, 1870 1880
AbstractThe 1858 discovery of crude oil in Ontario led to the development of a refining industry initially composed of many small firms. Ontario s refiners relied upon generous tariff protection in order to compete with cheaper, higher-quality imports. We apply a regime-switching model to the pattern of monthly wholesale prices to find the extent to which trade policy affected collusive efforts. Tariff protection encouraged collusion, but ease of entry resulted in frequent price wars. An 1877 downward revision in tariffs, while reducing the gains to collusion, also reduced the likelihood of entry and supported efforts to rationalize capacity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.
Volume (Year): 61 (2001)
Issue (Month): 02 (June)
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- KIYOTA Kozo & OKAZAKI Tetsuji, 2013.
"Effects of Industrial Policy on Productivity: The case of import quota removal during postwar Japan,"
13093, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
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- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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