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The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation

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  • Rosenbluth, Frances
  • Schaap, Ross

Abstract

This article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics. Based on evidence from twenty-two industrialized countries, we argue that electoral rules—specifically, the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal—have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system. Moreover, despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration, the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenbluth, Frances & Schaap, Ross, 2003. "The Domestic Politics of Banking Regulation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 307-336, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:57:y:2003:i:02:p:307-336_57
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 2006/034, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Anand, Kartik & Mankart, Jochen, 2020. "Sovereign risk and bank fragility," Discussion Papers 54/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    3. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong T.H., 2014. "Elections, political competition and bank failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 251-268.
    4. Donato Masciandaro, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Supervision Regimes: Markets, Institutions, Politics, Law or Geography?," Chapters, in: Kern Alexander & Rahul Dhumale (ed.), Research Handbook on International Financial Regulation, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong, 2012. "Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure," MPRA Paper 43603, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ashraf, Badar Nadeem, 2017. "Political institutions and bank risk-taking behavior," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 13-35.
    7. Bartolozzi, D. & Gara, M. & Marchetti, D.J. & Masciandaro, D., 2022. "Designing the anti-money laundering supervisor: The governance of the financial intelligence units," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1093-1109.
    8. Stef, Nicolae & Ben Jabeur, Sami & Scherer, Robert F., 2022. "Time to resolve insolvency and political elections," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Damette, Olivier & Kouki, Imen, 2022. "Political influence and banking performance: Evidence from the African countries," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 200-207.
    10. Hlaing, Su Wah & Kakinaka, Makoto, 2018. "Financial crisis and financial policy reform: Crisis origins and policy dimensions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 224-243.

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