Epistemic Democracy With Defensible Premises
AbstractThe contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the `wisdom of crowds'. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises -- voter independence -- is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that `large crowds are infallible'. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, `large crowds are fallible but better than small groups'. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha's (1993) seminal jury theorem for interchangeable (`indistinguishable') voters based on de Finetti's Theorem. We prove a more general and simpler version of such a theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Economics and Philosophy.
Volume (Year): 29 (2013)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
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Other versions of this item:
- Dietrich Franz & Spiekermann Kai, 2010. "Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises," Research Memoranda 066, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2010. "Epistemic democracy with defensible premises," MPRA Paper 40135, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2012.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Serguei Kaniovski, 2010. "Aggregation of correlated votes and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 453-468, September.
- Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, 05.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2002.
"A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence,"
2002-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Christian List & Franz Dietrich, 2002. "A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have The Same Evidence," Economics Series Working Papers 2002-W23, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2004. "A model of jury decisions where all jurors have the same evidence," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-15422, Maastricht University.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2008. "The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified," Research Memoranda 012, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013.
"Voting rules as statistical estimators,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Dietrich, Franz & Spiekermann, Kai, 2012. "Independent opinions? on the causal foundations of belief formation and jury theorems," MPRA Paper 40137, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2010.
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